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I.

Technical foundation

1.

Introduction
The recent emancipation of the nations of Eastern Europe and the

former Soviet Union from the rigid economic isolation accompanied by
central planning has prompted suggestions in the West for a Marshall Plan
II to ease the nations' transition to market economies.

Implied in this

suggestion is the belief that the original Marshall Plan, designed to aid the
recovery of Western Europe following World War II, represented a
successful blueprint from which to build a foreign aid package.

The plan

has been regarded by some scholars as a decisive factor In the revival of
intra-European trade, the integration of Western Europe In a newly
established multilateral trading system, and as the engine of growth which
drove the eventual integration of Western Europe into a single economic
unit.

In so doing, the U.S. government wove into the plan a complex web

of agencies, committees, politicians, and businessmen who interacted both
In the U.S. and Western Europe to produce an intricate collaborative
recovery effort.

A modern replication of the Marshall Plan applied to the

economies in transition obviously would be an immense undertaking, but
is this comparison justifiable?

An historical analysis of both the public and

private sector components of the Marshall Plan and the extent to which
they fostered economIC revival and integration within Western Europe
during the post-war era is clearly not without pertinence in the field of
international political economy today.

2.

Theoretical framework and research methodology
The 1980's and 1990's have witnessed both remarkable

achievements and setbacks in the process of deepening and solidifying the
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integration efforts of the European Economic Community that began in
1957 with the signing of the Treaies of Rome.

Developments such as the

Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, and the disclosure of U.S.
government documents after their mandatory thirty year storage in
archives, set off a vigourous debate among historians and political
economists, who now disagree over the extent to which American
the post-war era affected the integration process.

policy In

Scholars have disputed

the significance upon integration of public sector aid via the Marshall Plan
and private sector involvement via American investors.

This paper will

seek first to prove, in line with historian Michael Hogan's argument, that
there did exist American public-private sector cooperation in the post-war
era regarding European recovery and that this cooperation was an
international extension of corporatist ideology.

However, under this

corporatist rubric, the paper is next directed at establishing the depth of
the relationship between the Marshall Plan and American investment and
whether or not, taken together, they were significant factors responsible
for bringing the goal of economic integration within Europe to fruition.
For purposes of clarity and depth, the paper will focus on a ten year
time frame:

1947-1957.

The body of the work is divided into four major

sections subdivided and detailed in the Table of Contents.

This is an

appropriate decade for review because it can incorporate an adequate
analysis of the immediate effects of the Marshall Plan with periodic shifts
and/or trends in U.S. capital investment before the Treaties of Rome.

This

paper targets capital investment because considerable emphasis has
already been given to the surge in American foreign direct investment
(greenfield expansion) in Western Europe during this era, but little
attention has been given to whether or not a comparable surge existed In
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private sector portfolio diversification.

Furthermore, an analysis of

portfolio investment and possible links to the Marshall Plan provides an
alternative account of the degree of American influence upon the
integration process than one which has generally been associated with
analyses of greenfield investments.
The analysis of these issues is conducted by drawing from a
substantial body of literature that includes empirical evidence, first hand
accounts of the period in review, and current historical commentary with
specific consideration given to the Michael Hogan-Alan Milward debate
over the utility of the Marshall Plan and their respective schools of
thought.

Unless otherwise noted, the background information pertaining to

the period in review is considered to be a non-contentious issue.

Also, the

Marshall Plan is the unofficial name for the European Recovery Program
(ERP) and the two terms are used interchangeably.

For purposes of

simplicity, the statistical information on recovery and investment within
Europe pertains only to France, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.!
Furthermore, all analysis is confined to Western Europe as this was the
area targeted for integration after Central and Eastern European nations
became satellites of the Soviet Union.
As a final note, the author recognizes the immense scope of this
Issue, and as such acknowledges that many other factors contributed to the
realization of economic integration in Europe. 2

Yet, the depth and breadth

of scholarly debate about the Marshall Plan prevent their inclusion.

1 Also, these nations received the majority of U.S. aid under the Marshall Plan.
2 One of the prime motivations for Europeans to seek economic unity was the desire to
avoid prolonged external intervention, particularly by the United States, in
mediating conflict within Europe.
By tying the n~tions of Europe together
economically, especially Germany and France, Europeans felt that the resort to
warfare during times of crisis would diminish and eventually disappear as an option.
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Nevertheless,

the narrow focus on the American role in recovery does not

imply its pre-eminence as a factor behind the signing of the Treaties of
Rome.

This research, by omitting an analysis of these additional factors, In

no way dismisses their importance, but merely attempts to illuminate a
particular aspect of a tumultuous era in the field of international political
economy.

3.

Definition and development of corporatist ideology
Corporatism provides the most appropriate framework in which to

ground this paper SInce at its core is an emphasis on how and to what
degree the interactions between government and private sector interests
affect both policy planning and outcomes.

The application of corporatism

to studies on the Marshall Plan is not new, but neither is it widespread.
The most comprehensive and detailed research involving this combination
is that of Michael Hogan, whose 1987 book The Marshall P Zan provides a
suitable working definition.

Corporatism, as used in this paper, refers to:

"An American political economy founded on self-governing economic
groups, integrated by institutional coordinators and normal market
mechanisms, led by cooperating public and private elites, nourished by
limited but positive government power, and geared to an economic growth
in which all could share ... (this was a) brand of corporative neo-capitalism
that went beyond the laissez-faire political economy of classical theory but
stopped short of a statist syndicalism. "3

This American style of corporatism was embedded firmly within
Washington's policy processes by the time the recovery plans were drafted
and implemented.

However, in a departure from Hogan's conclusion that

the Marshall Plan was a triumph for corporatism, this paper, while

3 Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of
Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p.3. Hereafter
Hogan (1).
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agreeIng that corporatist ideology is the most useful means of analyzing
America's post-war recovery efforts regarding Europe, will challenge the
extent to which the collaborative efforts of government and business were
successful in nurturing private sector investment and fostering economic
integration within Europe.
Modern corporatism has its roots In the Hoover Administration when
cooperation between the government and industry, organized labor, and
interest groups became more acceptable and commonplace.

During and in

the period immediately following the Depression, the ties that Hoover had
sought to establish with the business community were emulated by
Roosevelt.

Of notable influence was the Business Council, a large

committee of the CEOs of America's largest corporations who frequently
advised the secretary of commerce.

Furthermore, the structure of

Roosevelt' s New Deal presented him with the opportunity to remold the
government-business relationship in a manner conducive to economIC
recovery.

According to John Reardon, "The Depression had profoundly

altered the attitude of business toward the Federal government and the
attitude of the Federal government-particularly the executive branch
toward business. "4

The Depression can then be seen as a driving force

behind corporative collaboration, but conditions created by World War II
cemented the relationship.
The need for increased industrial productivity and the accompanyIng
need for increased natural resources during the war changed the
government's position from one of mild verbal encouragement of foreign
investment to one of active partnership in international operations with

4 John J. Reardon, America and the Multinational Corporation (Westport:

1992), p. 35.

Praeger,
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American business.

Two sectors, rubber and oil, witnessed unprecedented

government involvement in foreign operations.

In the rubber industry,

the government permitted the cartelization of American rubber companies
in Latin America when their resources from East Asian plantations were
seized by Japanese troops.

The Roosevelt Administration became even

more involved with American oil companies who asked that aid be secured
for Saudi Arabia the country under the Lend-Lease program.

Eventually,

the government came to possess more direct control over the oil industry
through its funding of the Petroleum Reserve Corporation. S By the end of
the war, the amalgamation of government and business in the foreign
policy sphere was complete.

Consequently, this close relationship extended

into planning for recovery in Europe.

As Reardon has noted, "World War II

had not only created, but really solidified and made viable a partnership
between big business and the Federal government that was not going to
dissolve when the dozens of temporary wartime agenices of industrial
mobilization were abolished. "6 As a result of these lingering wartime
linkages, the public-private nexus permeated all aspects of the recovery
planning process.

II.
1.

Manifestations of corporatism
Incorporation of integration in U.S. policy

The idea of integration in Europe was not a revolutionary concept born from
the labor of analysts within the State Department at the close of World

War II.

Europeans themselves had considered forming a type of political or economic unio
on previous occasions, which dated back to the early Middle Ages.

S ibid., p. 33-34.
6 ibid., p. 35.

But, not until

I.
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the twentieth century did integration receIve a significant amount of support.

In

the years immediately following World War I, talk of European political solidarity
culminated in a proposal presented by Aristide Briand to the League of Nations in
1930 which emphasized collaboration and cooperation among European
governments.Briand also had suggested the formation of a customs union but the
economically tumultuous 1930's and the onset of World War II prevented further
elaboration on this point for the time being.

Nevertheless, "although Briand's

proposal was not acted upon, the European idea lived on. "7 The fact that integratio
"lived on" as a plausible catch-all solution to the woes of the Continent is attested

1

by the number of influential junior members of the State Department who openly
supported integration as essential to European post-war recovery as early as 1941
Men such as Charles Kindleberger, Walt Rostow, and Harold Van B. Cleveland
championed the cause in the United States.

Within Europe, figures such as Jean

Monnet, together with former Resistance leaders gave strong support to
unificationist ideas.

These men initially sparked the vision of integration as the

panacea for war-torn Europe, but in the United States, it was also seen as the meal
to promote American economic and security interests abroad.
The State Department, in conjunction with the White House and the
Treasury Department, began the process of planning for recovery in
Europe before the United States entered the war.

Eager to avoid a

replication of a breakdown in both the international economic and political
order that had followed World War I, recovery planners attempted to
fashion a method of recovery that would succeed in addressing two maIn
U.S. policy concerns:

the possibility of a westward spread of Soviet

communism and the establishment of a multilateral trading system.

7 Harry Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan and its Meaning (Ithaca:
Press, 1955), p. 346.

From

Cornell University
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the outset, the recovery planning process was characterized less by
altruistic tendencies toward the restoration of Europe than it was by
American self-interest and a desire to influence the international
institutions created at the close of the war.

Luckily for the Administration,

the sentiment was similar on Capitol Hill. "Considerable discussion took
place in Congress on the effect that the assistance program would have on
both the economic and the security interests of the United States. "8 When
the planning process took on a more substantive character in the mid
1940's, these concerns became transparent; they were the overridding
factors in the decision to push for an integrated Europe. 9
The rapid spread of communism into CeIltral and Eastern Europe and
the Cold War were driving forces behind U.S. policy toward Western
Europe in the post-war era.
overstated.

The importance of this influence can hardly be

As Marshall planner Joseph Jones remarked in 1955 , "No

doubt the greatest stimulus to our policy development since 1947 has been
the Soviet-Communist challenge." 10 Recognizing the security threat posed
to Western Europe by both the geographical proximity of Soviet Union and
the noticeable advancement of Communist parties within the teetering
political systems of the continental governments, the United States moved
with innovative rapidity to spur recovery.

To America, an economically

and politically fragmented Europe would only provide fertile soil for the
expansion of communist ideology; economic integration within Europe
would serve to hold communism at bay.
8 William Adams Brown, Jr. and Redvers Opie, American Foreign Assistance
(Menasha: George Banta Publishing Co. for the Brookings Institution, 1953), p. 15I.
9 It is important to note that during the early stages of recovery planning,
integration was not forcefully promoted as a main objective because Roosevelt sought
to avoid agitating the Soviets.
10 Joseph Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (San Diego:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
Publishers, 1955) p. 263.
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The 'Red Scare' took on a more substantive character when Great
Britain announced in February 1947 that it would no longer be able to
provide aid to Greece and Turkey, two countries where support for
communIsm was visible and where armed conflict with guerillas was a
security threat.

This perceived crisis provided an opportunity for the

Unites States to position itself at the doorstep of Europe's affairs.

When

discussing the launch of what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine,
Jones remarks, "he (Truman) chose the occasion of Greece to accept in the
name of the United States the world-wide responsibilities of great
power." 11 However, while Jones is correct in his assessment that the U.S.
used its leverage deftly in this instance, he too readily attributes the
decision to become involved to altruism.

A more realistic appraisal of the

situation is given by Fred Block, who argues that the political rhetoric
embraced in the Truman Doctrine paved the way for making acceptable
the idea of providing massive aid to Europe and tying it to an integration
effort.

Thus, the larger goal outlined by George Kennan of the containment

of communism provided a needed rallying point to sell the integration
idea.

Yet, aside from these geopolitical concerns, the U.S. also viewed

integration as a means of assuring greater stability in a multilateral
trading system that lay at the heart of the post-war Bretton Woods
negotiations.
By 1947, the United States perceived that the current piecemeal
assistance it provided to the countries of Europe had not yet revived its
productive capacity.

This, coupled with the agricultual shortage that was a

result of the harsh winter of 1946-1947, gave little assurance to the
United States that the recovery efforts thus far were producing the desired
11

ibid., p. 12.
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substantive results.

Furthermore, Anglo-American negotiations on the

issue of a multilateral trading order were proceeding slowly, with little
agreement on how Europe, particularly Germany, would be reincorporated
into the international system.

Facing a situation that appeared to be

growIng bleaker by the day and having exhausted all other policy options,
"American leaders (gave) the idea of European unification, or at least
economic integration, a prominent place in their policy planning ... (and)
they turned to integration as a method of... promoting multilateralism." 12
However, the precise means by which an integrated Europe might
better ensure a stable multilateral system were never clearly defined by
Marshall planners, although emphasis was placed on broadening the role of
the private sector to generate increased economic interdependence.
Scholars point to the increased efficency that would result from the
revival and integration of European production and trade and the
possibility that a coordinated continental market could better resolve its
imbalance with the dollar trading area than could the individual countries
of Europe)3 But, political economist John H. Williams suggests that such
conjecture was not necessarily a call to create a 'United States of Europe.'
He notes that the planners were well aware of the inherent flaws of such
an analogy and that to base a recovery program upon the assumption of
similiarity would have been damaging to Europe.

Any attempt to replicate

the U.S. domestic structure in Europe would have required both that
Europe turn inward at a time when its dependence on outside markets
could hardly be questioned and that it begin the process of fashioning
12 Michael Hogan, "The Search for a Creative Peace: the United States, European
Unity, and the Origins of the Marshall Plan." Diplomatic History (Summer 1982), p.
268. Hereafter Hogan (2).
13 John H. Williams, Economic Stability in a Changing World: Essays in Economic
Theory and Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 158.
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some type of political unIon.

Because of the undesirablility of the former

and the impracticality of the latter, the linkage between integration and
multilateralism was made only to the extent that it focused on such
economIC considerations as a revival of production and trade and the
formation of a payments unIon.

Whatever references made by American

policymakers with regard to deeper forms of integration, such as political
union, were at this time more for the sake of the rhetoric of the
multilateral debate than were reflective of actual short-term policy
plannning taking place in the Administration.
It was precisely this form of rhetoric-the talk of freedom,
democracy, and trade liberalization-that clouded over the more likely
reasons why American aid dollars were contingent upon integration
efforts:

the containment of communism and the desire to set and

administer the rules of a multilateral system.
integration was hardly an end in itself.

For U.S. policymakers,

It "had become a way to achieve

all other American objectives in Europe." 14 Against this backdrop, the
Marshall Plan was created.

2.

The Marshall Plan unveiled
The speech made by Secretary of State George C. Marshall at Harvard

University's commencement exercises on June 5, 1947 outlining what
would become the ERP was more the product of two months of feverish
planning than a detailed plan of action.

George Kennan of the Policy

Planning Staff, Walt Rostow, an economist in the German-Austrian division
of the State Department, and Joseph Jones of the Foreign Aid Committee at

14 Hogan, qtd. in Stanley Hoffman and Charles Maier, eds., The Marshall Plan:
Retrospective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 6.

A
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the State Department were among many who had been collaborating to
produce an aid program designed to achieve recovery in Europe and
address America's political and economic concerns via economic
integration.

In fact, Jones penned Dean Acheson's speech at the Delta

Council in May 1947 which presaged the recovery program that Marshall
would speak of at Harvard, although neither speech provided specific
details of what such a program would entail and how much aid would be
provided.
Furthermore, the press had provided some indication that a recovery
program was in the planning process.

Charles Kindleberger credits Scotty

Reston (a writer for The New York Times) with having had a hand in
stimulating public support and interest in a recovery program.

Reston

would discuss European recovery with Acheson and draw Acheson into
discussing plans under way in the Administration.

Inevitably, a front

page article on the subject would appear in ' The Times on the following
day.15 Thus, there was considerable evidence both behind the closed doors
of Washington and in the public arena that America was preparing to
launch some form of a recovery program.
these plans officially.

Marshall simply announced

He did, however, emphasize that the U.S. would be

prepared to substantially aid Europe only if Europe would help itself by
providing a blueprint for recovery.

As Acheson had remarked earlier, the

United States "must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in
their own way." 16 Europe did not hesitate to respond.

Within a few short

months after Marshall's speech and after intense negotiations, the nations
15 Charles Kindleberger, Marshall Plan Days (Boston: Allen and Unwin, Inc., 1987),
pp. 27-28.
16 Acheson, qtd. in Scott Jackson, "Prologue to the Marshall Plan: The Origins of the
The Journal of American
American commitment for a European Recovery Program."
History (March, 1979), p. 1058.
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of Europe had formed their first regional institution:

the Committee for

European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) and had submitted a recovery
proposal to Washington.
The speed with which Europe organized the CEEC has recently led
scholars to infer that Marshall and the Congress forced Europe into
planning unwillingly for economic integration by the threat of withholding
or not providing aid at all.

These intimations are dubious at best.

By this

point, Europeans themselves had realized the possible strength that could
lay in self-determined unity.

As Harry Price remarks,

"In Europe there was a gradual increase in understanding of the
necessity-with or without American aid-for association to build up
common efforts toward economic welfare and toward political
development
through whatever manifestations they might come to
take." 1 7

From both sides of the Atlantic, there appeared to be consensus that
substantive changes in the European economic structure would be a
necessary component of any recovery program.

What exactly those

changes would consist of and the extent to which they would be influenced
by American planners had yet to manifest themselves.
One change that was certain to take place with the implementation of
the ERP was the division of the continent into rival blocs.

Initially, U.S.

policymakers offered to include the Soviet Union and the nations of
Eastern Europe in the post-war aid program, but aware that the Soviet
Union would never endorse the proposition.
dual advantage.

Such a position entailed a

If the countries accepted the aid and the conditions linked

to it, a stronger foothold for U.S. influence in the region would be
imminent.

Or, if officials in Moscow refused to allow the satellites to accept

the aid, then the refusal would be seen as a rebuff to the goodwill of the
17 Price, p. 347-348.
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Washington.

The Administration then would have established ample

justification in the eyes of the international community for implementing
its agenda regarding the restoration of Western Europe.

If Europe were to

be divided, it would be seen as an unfortunate consequence caused by the
failure of the Soviet Union to cooperate.

This decision to extend aid to the

eastern part of the continent was a strategic diplomatic move.
Consequently, when Stalin recalled his foreign secretary V.M. Molotov from
the Paris Conference in July 1947 convened to discuss possible responses
to the aid offer, the division of Europe was a foregone conclusion.
After the conference, the immediate task that lay before the Truman
Administration was to find a way to consolidate the requests for aid that
Marshall had solicited from the Europeans into a package that it could sell
to a cautious, Republican-dominated Congress.

The Administration called

upon three appointed committees and standing committees within the
various departments to study different plans for recovery and to engage In
cost-benefit analyses.

Additionally, the private sector was solicited for

advice and was instrumental in shaping

policy.

Secretary of Commerce W.

Averell Harriman headed the Committee on Foreign Aid composed of
businessmen charged with the responsibility of determining America's
ability to undertake such a massive aid effort.

During these initial stages,

there could have been little doubt that the private sector would figure
prominently in any aid plan that the Congress would approve.
All in all, $29 billion had been requested by the CEEC, a sum which
was not even in the realm of congressional consideration.

In order to

convince Congress of the necessity of such an expensive plan, the 'United
States of Europe' rhetoric was used as a goading device.

The plan was sold

as a means to "refashion Western Europe in the image of the United
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States" 18 even though the Administration's inner circle knew of the distant
likelihood that Europe would accept that imposition as a condition for aid.
But Truman's men were not alone in the negotiations with Congress.

The

business community also was influential in persuading Capitol Hill to pass
the aid package.

Groups such as the American Association of

Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce exerted considerable
pressure on Congress that was keenly felt in both chambers.

What

emerged from Congress in the spring of 1948 was the Foreign Assistance
Act, Title I of which was the Economic Cooperation Act that provided the
ERP $5 billion in the first twelve months of its existence.1 9 Originally, the
ERP was to last until 1952, with an aid evaluation and congressional
renewal in each year in between.

This represented the bare bones of the

plan; a plan characterized by corporatism and a focus on economic
integration.
If the ERP's integrative efforts were the means to recovery, and
recovery was the means to a unified Europe that was a stable participant
In a multilateral system, the assistance provided by the Marshall Plan had
to be targeted toward specific areas that were crucial to the recovery
process.

Marshall planners cited the need for a payments union and both

technical and managerial assistance aimed at the revival and increased
efficiency of production and the restoration of intra-European trade.
Monetary aid alone, regardless of its amount, would have been insufficient
to address adequately these concerns.

Williams wisely noted at the time

that "American dollars should not be the main reliance. "20

Aware of this

possible pitfall, Marshall planners sought to supplement the aid by
18 Hogan 0), p. 89.
19 op. cit.
20 Williams, p. 86.
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encouraging the active participation of the American private sector in
recovery by including businessmen In the oversight of the program and
encouraging investment in Europe.

In fact, the Economic Cooperation Act

required that investment be targeted and it provided guaranty funds as an
enticement to investors.

Marshall planners had recognized that the

amount of official aid provided would be insufficient to accommodate
Europe's needs, so they stressed the need for private sector input.

If the

plan was to be judged a success in the manner that the planners had hoped
for, then collaboration was viewed as a sine qua non for stimulating the
needed additional investment.

For this reason, the private sector was

welcomed into the corporatist fold which came to characterize the ERP.

3.

Public-private sector collaboration in the recovery effort
Although planning for recovery began before the war had ended, In

its early stages, the process was not definitively corporatist.

The attention

later given to the importance of private investment was not initially
substantial.

Nevertheless, the private sector was determined early on to

keep its hand in the game.

In 1942, the prestigious Committee for

Economic Development (CED) was formed by leading executives and
academics to address issues pertinent to a recovery effort.

When Marshall

extended the offer of aid to Europe, the CED had firmly entrenched itself in
the recovery process.

In fact, one of the founders of the CED, Paul

Hoffman, was selected to head the Economic Cooperation Administration
(ECA) charged with implementation of the ERP.

It was through the ECA

that private interests were included in the drive to integrate Europe.
From the outset, the ECA was meant to be a corporatist alliance with
a somewhat heavier tilt toward the role of the private sector.

When

17
Congress was In the process of determining exactly how the ERP would be
administered, the Brookings Institution (an independent Washington think
tank), at the request of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, issued a report calling
for an independent agency which would report directly to the President
and would be composed of men from the private sector.

Vandenberg was

heavily influenced by the report and endorsed the recommendations of the
Brookings Institution on Capitol Hill.
structure of the ECA.

This resulted in the corporative

In assessing the congressional mandate which

officially created the ECA, Immanuel Wexler remarks that "in the final
analysis, the administrative organization of the aid program was as much a
product of nongovernmental contributions as were some of its essential
elements. "21
These "nongovernmental contributions" encompassed by the ECA
included:

the Public Advisory Board (PAB), numerous committees staffed

by individuals from the private sector, and industry-specific divisions.
Representatives from organized business, labor, and agriculture were
appointed to the P AB by Hoffman and the committees were staffed by
businessmen with extensive backgrounds in finance, law, and corporate
governance.

Men were recruited from General Motors, Standard Oil, Inland

Steel, Detroit-Edison, and Merck and Company to head the industrial
divisions based in the United States and to aid in the implementation of
the ECA's missions abroad. 22

And, aside from these representatives of big

business, the ECA was successful in obtaining the cooperation of American
trade unions.

According to Hoffman, "The trade unions of America (had) a

21 Immanuel Wexler, The Marshall Plan Revisited (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1983),
p. 31.
22 Michael Hogan, "American Marshall Planners and the Search for a European
Neocapitalism." American Historical Review (1985), p. 58-60. Hereafter Hogan (3).
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status of full partnership in the ECA not only from the standpoint of
operations but from the standpoint of making policy. "23

Quite obviously,

Hoffman had established himself as an ardent supporter of bipartisan,
arguably nonpartisan, corporatist collaboration and was determined to
have the ECA reflect that position.

That the ECA's structure, procedures,

and resulting policies were impacted significantly by such corporatism
within the United States is hardly questionable; this is a strong and
supportable argument offered by Hogan.

However, the extent to which

this tight collaboration, in its American form, was replicated in Europe is
slightly more tenuous.
The ECA did succeed in providing an organizational framework for
the continental participants in the ERP in which corporatism was a core
element.

It channeled efforts to establish a network of European business,

interest, and trade groups that were linked directly to the OEEC and the
ERP through advisory committees.

But the most visible linkages that the

ECA forged or supported were not those aimed at collaboration among the
Europeans involved in the recovery program, but a trans-Atlantic linkage
whereby the ECA would organize various American groups who were to
ally themselves with particular interests in Europe.

The ECA sponsored a

technical assistance program that began in 1948 and was responsible for
sending American managers, corporate executives, and academics to
Europe to offer advice and assistance to their European counterparts.
Hogan, exhibiting strains of paternalism,

refers to them as "roving

23 Hoffman, qtd. in Hogan (3), p. 61. Whether or not the trade unions agreed with
this lofty appraisal of their status in the ECA is the subject of another debate outside
the scope of this paper, but nevertheless significant.

19
ambassadors"24 while overlooking a less prosaIc but more likely
description.
Those Americans dispatched by the ECA under the technical
assistance program were not goodwill volunteers as much as they were
recruits sent to ensure that American aid dollars were spent the American
way.

Also, it is plausible to view them as a means to assuage the concerns

of private investors who were unsure of the Europeans' ability to maintain
stability and to provide a less risky atmosphere for the efficient and
profitable transfer of capital.

The ECA, albeit a supposed independent

body, was no less interested in promoting rapid economic integration,
stimulating investment and contributing to the achievement of America's
overall goals of political security and multilateralism than was the
Administration or Congress.

Since the ECA reported directly to the

President and operated with congressional funding provided under the
ERP, it would be naive to assume that the ECA conducted its business in a
vacuum, neither mindful of nor influenced by either branch's agenda.
Thus, although the ECA had the responsibility of managing the
practical aspects of the recovery program, it did so with an eye toward
promoting private American interests in Europe in a way that would be
beneficial to both the investors and to the integration process.

A

noteworthy example was the support given by the ECA to the efforts of the
Aldrich committee in matching up three American investment groups with
similar groups in Belgium, France, and Britain whose purpose was to
suggest development projects for American investors. 25 Yet, once again,
Marshall planners shied away from a detailed plan of action and declined
24 ibid., p. 62.
25 Hogan (3), p. 60.
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to set a numerical target that specified by what amount they had hoped to
increase the flow of private investment to Europe.

In fact, they never

clearly defined what type of investment was sought.

They were guided by

a "broad interpretation" of investment that included:
"contributions of capital goods, materials, equipment, services,
patents,
purchase of a share of
processes, and tehniques in the form of loans; the
ownership in a foreign enterprise; and the
participation in royalties,
earnings, or profits. ,,2 6

Given this vague framework, for purposes of clarity and simplicity, this
paper will define private investment in terms of loanable capital.

The

emphasis the planners placed on achieving integration, the depth of
collaboration in all major aspects of the recovery program, and the
perceived dependence on private investment were all significant aspects of
post-war corporatism; whether or not this corporatism which characterized
the Marshall Plan was directly responsible for triggering increased
portfolio investment in Europe is now the focus.

III.

1.

U.S. investment in Europe
The investment climate:

prospects, flashbacks, and

incentives
At the end of the war, the overall flow of American capital into
western Europe was not significant.

Capital investment was on the decline

in 1947 when only ten American corporations were responsible for 75% of
investment outflow. 27 Milward attributes this hesitancy among Americans
to invest to wariness over either the "security or profitability" that such
investments could offer, although he disputes the existence of any "crisis"
26 Brown, p. 172.
27 Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51 (London:

1984), p. 48.

Hereafter Milward (1).

Routledge,
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during 1947 that would have either made increased investment unlikely
or the Marshall Plan necessary.

In analyzing the post-war climate of

Europe, he asserts, "All that was immediately at stake was a malfunction of
international trade and payments ... "28 Surely such a situation would be
enough to make any potential investor wary!

Even though European

productivity had begun to recover and grow by 1947, the depth of the
wartime destruction of Europe's political, capital, and physical
infrastructures did not present potential investors with a favorable
atmosphere for investment. 29

Williams concured with this assessment

when he wrote at the close of the war, "Europe really is not a fit place now
for investment, conditions being what they are. "30

Also, new challenges

were arising as a result of the Cold War.
In mid-1948, responding to support among the former Allies for a
democratic West German government, Soviet troops denied all overland
access to Berlin.

When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was

formed a year later, a total blockade of Berlin was instituted.

The rapidity

with which the postwar world divided into competing ideological blocs
painted a rather bleak picture for investment.

In analyzing these events,

Reardon remarks that "the postwar world was not a particularly friendly
place for. . .investment. "31

Finding mechanisms for stimulating investment

in this type of environment was not an easy task for the ECA, but in
addition to the obstacles presented by a lack of infrastructure and the Cold

28 ibid., p. 55.
29 For a detailed summary of the specific conditions afflicting Western Europe at the
close of the war, refer to: J. Bradford De Long and Barry Eichengreen, "The Marshall
Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program." CEPR Discussion
Paper No. 634 (May 1992), pp. 12-16.
30 Williams, p. 267
31 Reardon, p. 43.
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War, the ECA had to overcome painful memories among investors of the
losses they incurred during the interwar era.
The 1920's were characterized by a growing U.S. economy with a rise
In domestic savings that contributed to a willingness among individuals
and corporations to supply Europe with needed capital in what Williams
has termed "the big decade of American private international
investment. "32 Investors were more than eager to provide loans for
reconstruction, as evidenced by the approximately $1 billion that was
invested abroad, mainly in Europe.3 3

Such activity was endorsed

throughout the twenties by the U.S. government which recognized how its
role in credit provision could be narrowed if the private role of providing
needed capital was widened.

Accordingly, the government specifically

refrained from restricting capital outflow.

The passage of the Federal

Reserve Act also aided this goal; regulations governing the operations of
foreign bank branches were relaxed.

Furthermore, the government

supplied Europe, particularly loans to Germany for reparations payments,
with credit substantive enough to have enticed investors into hedging their
bets on what appeared to be a relatively stable environment in which to
extend private loans.

When the U.S. abruptly cut this line of credit in

1928-29, the instability previously masked was revealed as many of the
investments formerly encouraged had been converted into gaping losses.
Eichengreen estimates that three-fourths of all foreign securities that U.S.
investors purchased in the twenties were in default by the end of the
1930s)4

The severity of the blow felt by investors leads Williams to

32 Williams, p. 76.
33 De Long, p. 15.
34 Barry Eichengreen, "The U.S. Capital Market and Foreign Lending, 1920-1955." in
Jeffrey Sachs, ed. Developing Country Debt and the World Economy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 242.
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conclude that the government "went too far after the first World War by
encouraging private investment in Europe. "35

However, to place the blame

on the government for failed investments ignores the equally important
factor of immense miscalculations on the part of the private sector itself.
Still, the memory of the losses incurred and the government's adjunct role
was one fresh in investors' minds twenty years later and proved a
formidable barrier for the ECA to overcome.
One of the methods that the government used to entice investors
back to · Europe was the guaranty funds provided in the Economic
Cooperation Act.

Hoffman was given authorization to extend up to $300

million to back private investments, which was not a particularly high
amount, but was significant enough to highlight the government's intention
to support private investors.

The Act also specified that the Europeans

themselves ought to back U.S. investors.

Under these European-based

guarantees, authorization was further extended to include coverage for
profits as well as initial investment costs.

American businessmen,

however, were not quick to take advantage of the funds. At the end of
1949, only $3.9 million in investments was guaranteed, and of that $3.5
million was in the United Kingdom.3 6

This sum was meager compared to

the amount that was provided for, but it was still early on in the recovery
process.

Given the hesitancy still felt by investors, any expectations of

maSSIve capital outflow, regardless of guarantees, were both unrealistic
and excessively optimistic.

Yet, in order to promote the corporative

framework and to convince Vandenberg and his colleagues that a serious
effort was being made to shift part of the burden for recovery from the

35 Williams, p. 267.
36 Milward (1), p. 120.
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public coffers to the private pockets, the funds were a necessary initiative
on the part of the ECA.

The funds, though, were not the only means by

which planners attempted to stimulate investment.
There had been a growing sense of frustration in the Congress over
this failure to stimulate investment that matched the aid set aside for that
purpose.

Public pressure mounted with each consecutive year that

funding for the ERP had to be renewed while a greater degree of private
sector involvement had not been achieved.
require additional appropriations was sought.

An option which would not
By 1950, the Administration

had presented Congress with a request to liberalize the tax laws on foreign
investment (both direct and portfolio) as another incentive.

But by 1951,

this risk-underwriting by the government did not produce levels of
investment that the guaranty funds supplemented by tax law revisions
could have covered.

This should not lead to the assumption that increased

U.S. investment in Europe was not taking place, but merely illustrates that
it was not taking place to a significant degree by investors taking
advantage of the guaranty funds. Judgment on this matter must be
reserved following a more detailed analysis of investment flows.

2.

Economic and political arguments for increased investment
Marshall planners had pinned their hopes on investment as an

additional boon to integration for both economic and political reasons.

In

the first respect, capital investment was recognized as a key component of
sustained economic growth that would supplement and enhance efforts
underway to revitalize intra-European trade, improve Europe's balance of
payments position, and draw Europe into a multilateral trading system.
The strength of this argument linking investment and growth had been
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acknowledged and supported by economic theorists with increased
attention given to studies on the business cycle that emerged during the
plan years.3 7 Investment patterns in the short run were seen as
determinants of growth trends in the long run and as crucial to the
reconstruction of the European economy.

The consistency and

sustainability of any increased investment was dependent upon four
variables:

derived demand for capital goods, profit incentive and

expectation, money market conditions (including interest rates and
monetary liquidity), and government policies of subsidization and
taxation.3 8

Another concern, reflected in the establishment of the EPU In

1950, was Europe's balance of payments position.

It was recognized that

unless this problem was rectified, Europe's money market would remain
distorted, which would deter the flow of loanable capital from potential
American investors

Marshall planners, through devices such as the

assistance program, guaranty funds, and tax law revisions, attempted to
manipulate those variables and market conditions in an effort to . create an
atmosphere conducive to

investment.

Yet these theoretical underpinnings

were only half of the rationale for the encouragement of investment.

The

political rationale underlying this focus on investment was equally
important.
The oft-repeated remark that Marshall planners were striving to
'make the world safe for American capitalism' is not far from the truth,
given the political climate in which they operated.

In order to resell the

37 In his United Nations report Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy,
Geneva, 1954, Ingvar Svennilson provides a detailed synthesis of current research in
business cycle theory that draws heavily from R.R. Harrod's Towards a Dynamic
Economics, London, 1948 and J.R. Hicks' A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade
Cycle, Oxford, 1950.
38 Svennilson, pp. 6-7.
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plan on Capitol Hill each succeSSIve congressional year and to assure
taxpayers that ERP aid would be a benefit, rather than a detriment, to a
booming post-war domestic economy, planners also had to incorporate a
vision of how the private sector could profit from the assistance program.
They described investment as not only a means by which integration could
be encouraged, but also as a means for American business to exert greater
influence in a multilateral system.

Seen in this light, corporative

collaboration in this era did not occur solely to put Europe back on its feet;
corporatism occurred because it was politically necessary.
planners thus were faced with a dilemma:

Marshall

on the one hand, the situation

in Europe had to be presented to Congress as so serious that the need for
f

aid was unquestionable. Yet on the other, they had to reassure investors
that their money was relatively safe in the European market.

With the

experiences of the interwar era, this was indeed an arduous task.

But, the

significant differences between the post WWI recovery and conditions In
1947-8 reveal that perhaps the picture of Europe painted by the
Administration was not entirely accurate.
By all accounts, the recovery in Europe after World War II was faster
than it had been following the first World War.

De Long and Eichengreen

compare recovery levels after both wars in terms of a per capita GDP
average of Britain, France, and Germany (West after WWII) and estimate
that the degree of recovery achieved by Europe in the sixteen years
immediately following WWI was replicated after WWII in only six years,
and half of that had been achieved by 1949,39

They also compare the

recovery of Western European coal, steel, and cement production for both
periods and note that in all three sectors, production rates had been
39 De Long, p. 17.
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steadily rIsIng between 1947-1949 and had increased dramatically
following 1949, leading them to conclude that recovery was much more
rapid the second time around.

Furthermore, dollar imports to western

Europe for capital goods rose between 1946 and 1947;

this evidence lends

credence to Milward's argument that when the ERP came into effect in
1948, it did more to sustain a production boom already under way than to
cause one to occur. 40 Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that despite
such promising figures, Europe was still struggling with a severe balance of
payments crisis due in large part to a dollar shortage and the effects of the
ERP ought not yet to be minimized without an adequate analysis of
additional statistics relating to European recovery and growth and U.S.
investment in Europe during the decade in question.

3.
Table
Table
Table
Table

4.

Statistical evidence-See Appendix for tables
I:
II:
III:
IV:

Gross National Product and Capital Formation (GNP and CF)
Total U.S. Foreign Lending
Value of U.S. Direct Investment by Area
Deposits in Savings Banks

Analysis of statistical data
First, it is necessary to evaluate the process of recovery and growth

In Western Europe in the immediate post-war era from the data in Table I
before a comparison can be made to investment levels.

A cursory glance

at the national account data reveals that in France, West Germany and the
United Kingdom, GNP rose steadily each consecutive year in the decade
following the war, except for a brief dip in France's GNP between 1947-48.

40 Alan Milward, "Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?" Diplomatic History
238. Hereafter Milward (2).

(1989), p.
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During the last three years of actual aid transfers by the ERP,41 France's
GNP rose by 109%, the United Kingdom's by 102%, and West Germany's by
120 %.42 It is not suprising that West Germany posted higher growth rates
in GNP than the other two since large amounts of Marshall Plan aid had
been targeted specifically to the revival of its coal production which had
been decimated during the war.

Milward notes that during this period,

"the increase in output in West Germany continued unabated" although
overall coal production in Europe was still below plan targets. 43 It is also
important to note that during the ERP years, there does not exist a drastic
upward shift in any of the three countries' GNPs.
significant and relatively smooth.

The climb each year was

Furthermore, the termination of

Marshall aid in 1952 does not appear to have had a negative effect on GNP;
figures continued to rise steadily between 1953 and 1957.

In these five

years, French GNP rose by 122%, British by 111 %, and German by 135%.
Combining these two stages (1950-1957) gives the following overall
Increases in GNP:

France, 137%; United Kingdom., 123%; and Germany,

174%.
A reVIew of the figures for growth in capital formation reveals
results similar to the rising trend noted for GNP growth.

As before, a

comparison of the three countries will begin with 1950 due to the absence
of data for France and Germany in the three years prior and due to the fact
that a large proportion of Marshall funds prior to 1950 were used for food
purchases rather than capital formation, especially in the United
41

It is difficult to compare all three countries until 1950 since data for West
Germany is not available on GNP for the first two years of the ERP.
42 All percentage changes were calculated by dividing the figures n + (1 ... 7
depending on the years of comparison) years by base year n and multiplying by 100.
For example, France's GNP growth of 109% during 1950-52: 202.1/184.9 = 1.09 x 100 =
109%.
43 Milward (1), p. 410.
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Kingdom.44 Overall capital formation was high during the post-war decade
throughout all of Europe.

For the entire period 1950-57, CF levels rose

each consecutive year for both the United Kingdom and Germany.

France's

CF levels rose overall, but dropped during the last two years of the ERP
before picking up again in 1954.
During the remaining ERP years, British CF levels moved upward,
adding a total of only £21 million over those three years.

Similarly,

Germany had rising CF levels at this time, but like the United Kingdom, the
actual increased value was relatively small:

3.6 million deutschmarks.

For

France, 1950-52 was a period of decline in CF as it posted two consecutive
declines totaling one million francs.

In the following year, CF declined by

another 2 million francs before rebounding again in 1954.
France are peculiar in that they present a paradox:

The figures for

France spent more of

its ERP counterpart funds on capital investment than any other European
country and half of all counterpart funding under the ERP was spent in
France.

Yet, it is the one country whose CF levels decline over the course

of the ERP.

A rather sketchy, but perhaps only acceptable explanation is

that the funding for capital investment from ERP funds remained the same
in France while funding from the French government and private capital
market declined to a degree greater than the amount of the aid funds.
This could have easily been the case considering that investments targeted
under France's Modernization Plan created conflict between the private
capital market which could not service all of the demand and public banks
which were unwilling to underwrite many of the investment projects. 45
Moreover, the French figures illuminate why the entire analysis of capital

44 ibid., p. 104.
45 ibid., p. 109.
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formation throughout Europe and its relationship to ERP aid
contentious one.

IS

a

Milward explains:

"What proportion of Marshall Aid funds did actually contribute to capital
formation cannot be determined, because all of them could theoretically
have had the effect, no matter how it was deployed within the economy, of
releasing other funds for investment. "4 6

In any case, a more detailed analysis of these figures is beyond the scope
of this paper, but having established that a steady growth in GNP and
capital formation occured over the years before, after and during the ERP,
it is safe to concur with Milward's analysis that the dollar aid provided
under the Marshall Plan supplemented, but did not necessarily create an
upward recovery trend.
Dissecting the data on investment from Table II presents the same
problem.

Eichengreen's data are all-inclusive and non Euro-specific as he

addresses the difficulties in conducting his analysis, "consistent country
data on the extent of total foreign borrowing after World War II are
notoriously difficult to obtain. "47 Thus, although it is known that private
investors used only 1.3% of the guaranty funds by 1951 for investment in
Europe, trying to attribute that investment to specific Marshall plan dollars
is much like searching for a needle in a haystack.

Nevertheless,

Eichengreen's data does provide significant insight into post-war
investment trends that can be analyzed against the recovery figures.
Direct long-term lending (DLT) by U.S. investors declined from 1947
1955, with a sharp decline of 57% between the plan yearsl947-51.

At the

end of 1952, which corresponded with the end of Marshall aid to Western
Europe, that percentage decline had been fully restored before falling

46 ibid., p. 107
47 Eichengreen, p. 243.

31
agaIn In both 1953 and 1954, suggesting that no link, or a very weak one
at best, was created between the Marshall Plan and private investment.
At the end of 1955, DLT rose again, but not by enough to restore it to
immediate post-war levels.
1947.

It settled at only 95% of what it had been In

Unlike DLT, which was characterized by a semi-smooth trend of

falling investment, other long-term lending (OL T) by private investors
initially rose swiftly and sharply, posting a 938% increase between 1947
1950.

Yet, by the end of 1953, OLT had plummeted, only to again rise

dramatically in 1954 and 1955.
post-war decade.

Overall, OLT increased by 425% in the

Short-term lending (SLT) followed a rollercoaster-like

path, a path which reflects the inability of ERP funding to stabilize
consistent upward growth in this sector.
1947-49 then rose 130% in 1950.
before sinking again in 1953.

It dropped almost 200% between

SLT dropped slightly between 1951-52

The next year witnessed a remarkable

increase of 477.5% in SLT which was quickly offset in 1955 by a 334%
decrease.

Throughout all of these rapid shifts, however, SLT in 1955

measured a modest 88% of 1947 levels.

Finally, private unilateral

transfers dropped during most of the ERP years, rising only between 1951
52 and 1952-53 before dropping again and leveling off at 58% of 1947
levels.

The inference drawn here, even allowing for the increase in OLT, is

that certain divisions of private American investment during this decade
were depressed to a degree, but not altogether invisible.

Eichengreen

attributes this decline to the effect that inter-war defaults had on U.S.
investors rather than on particular post-war conditions abroad. 48
However, data from Mitchell in Table III suggest that post-war conditions
In Europe did contribute to wariness among U.S. investors.
48 ibid., p. 246.
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In Table III of investment in Canada, Latin America, and Western Europe
reals that although U.S. investment was increasing slowly in Europe, the
majority of funds flowing out of the United States were being invested
elsewhere during the post-war decade.

Between 1950 and 1957, U.S.

investments in Canada and Latin America were relatively on par with one
another and each were double the amount of the funds being channeled to
Europe.

Thus, although Mitchell corroborates Eichengreen's conclusion that

substantial flows of private capital to Europe did not exist at this time, his
data refutes Eichengreen's contention that investors were too nervous to
invest anywhere and suggests that they may have been acutely affected
by conditions particular to Europe.
A conclusion of this rudimentary analysis suggests that there does
not exist a causal relationship between U.S. private investment and the
remarkable recovery of France, the United Kingdom, and Germany.

An

interesting correlation, however, does exist between these recovery levels
and domestic savings in these countries.

A brief look at the savings data

for France and Germany reveals that in each country, deposits in savIngs
banks rose each consecutive year without falling once, increasing over the
decade by 678% and 1768%, respectively!

In the United Kingdom, deposits

in trustee savings banks rose each year while deposits in Post Office
Savings banks (POS) steadily declined, although not to a large degree.
Deposits in the trustee accounts rose by 156% and the POS deposits In 1957
stood at 86% of 1947 levels.

Given the basic correlation that exists

between domestic savings rates and sustained economic growth,49 it is not
implausible to conclude that savings, viewed against what U.S. private
investment did exist, may have made a more direct contribution to the
49

For elaboration, see Svennilson.
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recovery process In Western Europe than did the products of U.S.
corporatism.

Furthermore, the vagueness which characterized the

Marshall planners overall goal of increased investment makes it even more
difficult to arrive at a benchmark for determining a specific numerical link
between dollars from the ERP and dollars from the private sector.
However, it is reasonable to infer from the foregoing analysis that a high,
or even steadily climbing, rate of overall U.S. private investment was
largely absent during and immediately after the plan years.

Even so,

drawing on their own resources, official dollar aid and other aspects of the
Marshall Plan, Europeans did not deviate far from the path to economic
in te gra tion.

IV.

The Road to Rome

1.

European efforts toward economic integration
Although the Marshall Plan's corporative structure provided an

additional impetus, both economic and political, to the push toward
economIC integration on the Continent, Europeans were clearly determined
to set their own agenda on this Issue.

Three significant developments took

place within western Europe In the post-war decades that were harbingers
of the Common Market.
First, the establishment of a customs union received serious attention
at the conclusion of the war, but "this was, in a sense, only a continuation
of the discussion at the point where it had been broken off in the
'thirties. "50 The Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, and
Luxembourg) made significant headway in this area absent of American

50 United Nations, Economic Survey of Europe Since the War, Geneva (February,
1953), p. 224.
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support as their efforts to "come together in a close economic unIon,
without trade barriers and with free movements of labour and capital,
goes back to 1943,"51 years before the words 'Marshall Plan' had been
spoken on the lips of anyone in Washington.

By 1948, customs duties

among the three had been abolished and a common tariff was erected,
although the effective implementation of these measures was not felt
immediately.

Next, in 1949, all quantitative restrictions had been removed

and by 1952, the United Nations observed that "the establishment of the
Benelux union has, so far, been accompanied by some increase in the
relative importance of each partner in the trade of the other country. "52
Thus, the decision to create a customs union for all of Western Europe was
not without a guiding precedent.
Second, the establishment in 1950 of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) was another crucial forerunner of the Common Market
that was achieved largely indepedent of direct American persuasion,
economIC or political.

Obviously, Marshall Planners exerted influence upon

the formation process of the ECSC, but it was still a distinctively European
institution.

European politicians recognized that an indefinite presence of

an international Ruhr authority would not be preferable and that
Europeans themselves needed to find a solution which would insure long
term stability in the region.

This meant that the possibility of another war

between Germany and France had to be rendered, "not merely
unthinkable, but materially impossible. "53 Under Schuman's proposal, the
resources and productive capabilities in coal and steel of France, Germany,
51 ibid., p. 225.
52
53

53 op. cit.

Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, qtd. in John Pinder, European
Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.l.
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Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg were consolidated under
a common authority-the ECSC.
The third distinctly European effort toward integration occurred at
the 1955 Messina Conference in Sicily where the six foreign ministers of
the ECSC met to consider the recommendations to found "a common
organization to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the
initiation of a common European market, free from all customs duties and
all quantitative restrictions. "54

Messina was the last conference that

Monnet attended in his capacity as president of the ECSC's High Authority.
Monnet then founded the 'Action Committee for the United States of
Europe' whose purpose was to contribute to a more substantial effort
toward integration, which he thought was lacking at Messina.

The

committee, composed of European politicians directly courted by Monnet,
first convened on January 18, 1956 and reaffirmed the decision to create a
supranational nuclear energy authority by asking its members to present
the recommendation to their respective national parliaments.

Within five

months, the six foreign ministers had given consideration to the Action
Committee's proposals, and on May 29-30, they voted to support both an
energy union and a Common Market.
These steps led to the passage of the Treaties of Rome, which officially
created Euratom and the European Economic Community (EEC), on March
25, 1957.

On January 1, 1958 the treaties came into effect and the largest

major step toward European economic integration had been realized.

2.

Concluding remarks

54 Hans A. Schmitt, The Path to European Union: From the Marshall Plan to the
Common Market (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), p.232.
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The question posed in the title of this paper does not lend itself to a
simple resolution.

But having considered the analysis within the confines

of this study, the answer must be a qualified no for two reasons:

first, as

was just discussed, it is highly likely that some form of economic
integration would have evolved as a result of intra-European initiative
with or without assistance as far-reaching as the Marshall Plan and second,
steadily increasing U.S. private investment during and immediately after
the plan years was not established.
The lack of a causal relationship between Marshall Plan dollars and
private investment negates the concept of the two being dependent upon
one another for their success in the post-war era.

The evidence is

unmistakably clear that ERP aid did little to instill confidence within the
minds, and more importantly, the pockets, of private investors.

The

absence of any credible contrary data further diminishes the importance of
U.S. portfolio investment as a factor in European economic integration.
However, although the two factors taken together and portfolio investment
considered on its own merit did not substantially contribute to the
integration process, the Marshall Plan taken by itself appears to have had
important ramifications in this regard.
The Marshall Plan was a remarkable corporative achievement that
succeeded in laying a stable foundation for the eventual economic
integration of Europe, although it did not do so by dramatically affecting
the flow of private dollars onto the continent.

It did not need to.

Private

investment was not a necessary condition for the Marshall Plan to be
judged as a success, nor was the plan dependent on that investment to
promote integration.

Economic integration evolved despite the immediate

absence of investment in the post-war era.

But, investment aside, there
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did exist substantive achievements of the ERP which supplemented and
enhanced the efforts made within Europe.
Planners at the ECA, appointees within the Administration, officials
within the State Department, and citizens from the private sector
rigorously encouraged the development of corporative collaboration In
Europe, even if it was being achieved in a manner distinct from the style
which had evolved in the United States.

They encouraged the

development of European corporatism through the linkages it established
with groups such as the OEEC.

The ECA provided technical and managerial

assistance, coordinated plans for investment (even though the dollars were
slow to follow), and continuously monitored progress toward integration.
This conclusion simultaneously vindicates the arguments of both the Hogan
and Milward, while recognizing the limitations of each.

Hogan is correct to

assess the recovery decade as one characterized by a corporative structure
throughout both the political and economic aspects of the ERP, but the
emphasis he places on the necessity of the mutual participation of both the
American public and private sectors in the recreation of Europe's
economies is exaggerated.

Milward has illuminated and refuted several

misconceptions about the depth of economic devastation in Europe at the
end of the war.

He is correct in suggesting that the recovery process was

well under way prior to the establishment of the ERP.

Yet, he exaggerates

his argument as well, taking it to the other extreme-Europe would have
recovered without the Marshall Plan.

A more logical conclusion would be

that the Marshall Plan may not have been Europe's salvation, but neither
was it useless.
When political economists today consider the feasibility of a
'Marshall Plan II' for the nations of Eastern Europe, they would be well
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advised to consider the implications of the first one.

At the end of the day,

the socio-political framework established through, and sometimes
independent of corporative collaboration, appears to have had a more
lasting effect upon economic transformation in Europe than any amount of
short-term monetary assistance-public or private.

Appendix
I.

National Accounts Totals:
Gross National Product and
Capital Formation 55
France
W.Germany
GNP/CF

United
GNP/CF

1949 3360/...
( 1959)
1950 184.9/36.9
1951 195.9/36.5
1952 202.1/35.9
1953 207.5/33.9
1954 216.8/38.1
1955 227.9/41.6
1956 241.2/49.4
1957 253.3/52.1

1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955

GNP/CF

( ... )
6336/650
6521/600
(1963)
20880/2497

(1938)
1947 3150/.. .
1948 3410/.. .

II.

Kingdom

(1938)
... / .. .
... / .. .

... / .. .
(1954 )
112.9/25.7
125.0/26.4
135.4/29.3
145.6/30.6
157.4/35.6
174.4/45.0
186.4/46.3
196.5/47.7

21720/2632
22303/2642
22169/2653
23178/2941
24065/3191
24800/3371
25256/3525
25762/3712

Total Private U.S. Foreign Lending 56

DLT

OLT

ST

UT

546
486
468
424
311
537
469
425
523

36
47
57
338
268
135
-118
204
153

137
78
-133
102
63
59
-107
404
121

497
470
377
310
258
279
321
121
290

B.R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics 1750-1970 (London:
MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1975), pp. 785-795. All figures are in constant prices
with base years in brackets and represent millions of francs,
deutschmarks, or pounds, respectively.
Three periods ... represents an
unavailable figure.
56 Eichengreen, p. 244. All figures are in millions of current dollars at
1919-28 prices as he had also included lending statistics during the post
World War I decade. DLT is direct long term lending, OLT is other long term
lending, SLT is short term lending, and UT is unilateral transfers.
55

III.

Value of U.S. Direct Investment by Area 57

Canada
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957

Latin

3579
3972
4593
5242
5871
6494
7460
8332

IV.

America

Western

Europe

1720
1979
2146
2369
2369
3004
3520
3393

4735
5176
5758
6034
6244
6608
7459
8805

Deposits in Savings Banks 58
United

Kingdom

W.

e
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1 956
1957

162/147
206/192
249/238
317/301
357/337
450/389
560/469
669/560
850/664
991/755
1098/823

732/1943
799/1948
857/1948
909/1934
932/1876
954/1852
969/1747
1020/1727
1054/1700
1094/1688
1140/1677

... / ...
1159
2197
2898
3563
5314
8120
11930
14791
16963
20487

57 United States Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United

States, Colonial Times to 1957, Washington, D.C. (1960), pp. 564-566. All
figures in millions of constant dollars.
58 Mitchell, pp. 693-695. (a) is private savings, (b) National Savings Bank,
(c) Post Office Savings Bank, (d) trustee savings banks, (e) all savings. All
figures are in thousand million francs, million pounds, and million
deutschmarks, respectively.
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